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“FRANKLY UNTHINKABLE”: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL FAILINGS OF PRESIDENT
TRUMP’S PROPOSED MUSLIM REGISTRY
A. Reid Monroe-Sheridan*
ABSTRACT
On several occasions during the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump
endorsed the creation of a mandatory government registry for Muslims in the United
States—not just visitors from abroad, but American citizens as well. This
astonishing proposal has received little attention in legal scholarship to date, even
though Trump has refused to renounce the idea following his election to the
presidency.
In this Article, I attempt to address President Trump’s proposal in several ways.
First, I aim to provide a thorough analysis demonstrating unequivocally that such a
“Muslim registry,” with the characteristics President Trump has endorsed, would
violate the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. Second, drawing context
from Trump’s executive orders limiting immigration from certain Muslim-majority
countries, I analyze the constitutionality of a possible program disguised to avoid
overt discrimination among religions but still operating in effect as a “Muslim
registry.” This too, I aim to demonstrate, would be a clear violation of the
Constitution. Finally, I consider certain constitutional defenses that proponents of
the “Muslim registry” have already raised or appear likely to raise in support of the
program. I conclude that these arguments are unconvincing.
This Article ultimately attempts to demonstrate, through a methodical analysis
of case law, legal scholarship, and the public record, that what President Trump has
proposed is plainly unconstitutional. If this conclusion is not surprising, it is
significant; even after assuming the presidency, Donald Trump has refused to
disavow a policy that would clearly violate the constitutional rights of American
citizens.
I. INTRODUCTION
“You tell me.”
This was the response of then-presidential candidate Donald Trump when asked
how his proposal to require all Muslims in the United States to register in a database
would be different from the registration obligations imposed on Jews in Nazi
Germany.1 In fact, during the presidential campaign Trump made numerous
* Assistant Professor, Keio University Law School (Tokyo, Japan); Registered Foreign Attorney in
Japan (New York-qualified). I am deeply grateful to the faculty of Keio Law School, especially Professor
David Litt, for the support and resources that made this Article possible.
1. Trip Gabriel, Donald Trump Says He’d ‘Absolutely’ Require Muslims to Register, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 20, 2015, 1:31 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/11/20/donald-trump-sayshed-absolutely-require-muslims-to-register/ [http://perma.cc/MP22-BN5F]. Under Nazi rule, Germany
created various registries of persons and property. Among these were the “Gestapo card indices” which
were “the register of persons politically undesirable to the National Socialist regime,” including Jews.
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references to a registry or database that would target Muslims in the United States.2
Trump’s statements on this topic have been inconsistent and, taken collectively, are
difficult to reduce into a coherent policy proposal.3 However, Trump has not
abandoned the idea; in the wake of the December 2016 terrorist attack in Berlin,
Trump (then President-elect) “appeared to stand by his plans to establish a registry
for Muslims.”4
Various high-profile Trump supporters have publicly endorsed some form of
registry or mass incarceration targeting Muslims in general or suspected (but not
formally charged) Islamic terrorists. Shortly after Trump’s electoral victory, a
spokesman for a Trump-supporting political action committee argued on Fox News
that the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II was “precedent” for
a registry of immigrants from Muslim countries.5, 6 Immediately following the June

Robert Kempner, The German National Registration System As Means of Police Control of Population,
36 J. OF CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 362, 378 (1946).
2. Aaron Blake, Trump Says We’ve Known His Muslim Ban and Database Plans ‘All Along.’ But We
Still Don’t — Not Really., WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2016/11/17/the-evolution-of-donald-trump-and-the-muslim-database/
[http://perma.cc/4L6DZVS9]; Vaughn Hillyard, Donald Trump’s Plan for a Muslim Database Draws Comparison to Nazi
Germany, NBC NEWS (Nov. 20, 2015, 9:27 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016election/trump-says-he-would-certainly-implement-muslim-database-n466716 [http://perma.cc/L3BVERZ8].
3. Blake, supra note 2.
4. Abby Phillip & Abigail Hauslohner, Trump on the Future of Proposed Muslim Ban, Registry: ‘You
Know My Plans’, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2016/12/21/trump-on-the-future-of-proposed-muslim-ban-registry-you-know-my-plans/
[http://perma.cc/4L6D-ZVS9]. As of this writing, Trump himself has not disavowed the proposal.
However, prior to his December 2016 statement, Trump’s campaign had seemingly walked back the
proposal, stating that Trump “has never advocated for any registry or system that tracks individuals based
on their religion.” Blake, supra note 2. The ambiguity increased with a January 18, 2017 statement from
Nikki Haley, then Trump’s nominee for ambassador to the United Nations, that she and “[Trump’s]
administration” do not “think there should be any registry based on religion.” Ben Kamisar, Haley: No
Muslim Registry Under Trump Administration, THE HILL (Jan. 18, 2017, 11:27 AM),
http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/314808-haley-no-justification-for-muslim-registry
[http://perma.cc/JG88-LZTQ]. To add to the confusion, Rex Tillerson, the Secretary of State, has refused
to rule out such a policy. Ben Kamisar, Tillerson Won’t Rule Out Muslim Registry, THE HILL (Jan. 11,
2017, 4:06 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/313846-tillerson-wont-rule-out-muslimregistry [http://perma.cc/3JEN-EUE7].
5. Blake, supra note 2. Members of the legal community will recognize that the spokesman, Carl
Higbie, was presumably referring to Korematsu v. United States, which found that a military order for the
exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry for certain areas in the San Francisco Bay Area did not
violate the Constitution. 324 U.S. 214 (1944). Higbie is correct to the extent that Korematsu has never
been overturned, but the occasion for the Supreme Court to reconsider the case has not arisen since it was
decided in 1944. In 2015, Justice Stephen Breyer stated, “I think everyone I’ve ever run into thinks that
case was wrongly decided.” NCC Staff, Breyer Doesn’t See Another Korematsu Situation in Near Future,
CONST. DAILY (Dec. 28, 2015), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2015/12/breyer-doesnt-see-anotherkorematsu-situation-in-near-future/ [http://perma.cc/6XEW-HJG2]. Korematsu is discussed in detail in
Part III.C.
6. Following Trump’s comments proposing a temporary ban on all Muslims entering the United
States, Al Baldasaro, a New Hampshire state representative and co-chair of Trump’s national veterans
coalition, said, “What he’s saying is no different than the situation during World War II, when we put the
Japanese in camps.” Lindsey Bever, Internment Camps? ‘I Certainly Hate the Concept,’ Donald Trump
Says.,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
8,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
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2017 London Bridge terrorist attacks, Nigel Farage, an outspoken supporter of
Trump and onetime “unofficial advisor” to the president,7 called for the mass
internment of 3,500 suspected terrorists in the United Kingdom in a segment on Fox
News.8 On his radio show the next day, Michael Savage enthusiastically endorsed
Farage’s proposal, which Savage himself described as “World War II-style
internment camps,” and asked why FBI Director James Comey had not already
interned “Islamists who are on the watchlist in America.”9 Vice President Mike
Pence has said that Trump “respects and admires” Savage, and Savage has stated that
he “had a big hand in helping Donald Trump . . . get his message across and,
therefore, getting him elected . . . .”10 (In a related context, Trump defended his 2015
proposal to ban all Muslims from entering the United States, purportedly for national
security purposes, by citing President Roosevelt’s wartime policies with respect to
“Germans, Italians and Japanese.”11 When asked, Trump clarified that he was
referring to Roosevelt’s proclamations affecting foreign nationals and not the
internment of Japanese-Americans.)12
The closest analog to Trump’s database proposal in recent U.S. counterterrorism
policy is the “NSEERS” (National Security Entry-Exit Registration System)
program. Indeed, shortly after Trump’s victory in the 2016 election, Kris Kobach,
the secretary of state of Kansas, was photographed together with Trump while
carrying a document labeled “Kobach Strategic Plan for First 365 Days” for the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), which included as its first item the
reintroduction of the “NSEERS screening and tracking system.”13
The NSEERS program was implemented by the Bush Administration following
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and effectively terminated under President

politics/wp/2015/12/08/trump-on-internment-camps-i-certainly-hate-the-concept/
[http://perma.cc/K4VA-ZKQT].
7. Phil Bryant, a Trump supporter and the Governor of Mississippi, described Nigel Farage as a “close
but unofficial adviser” in January 2017. Christopher Hope, Nigel Farage Will Be Made ‘Unofficial
Adviser’ to Donald Trump, Close Ally Says at Glittering Party Overlooking White House, TELEGRAPH
(Jan. 21, 2017, 8:31 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/20/nigel-farage-trumps-win-partworld-revolution/ [http://perma.cc/C2FV-TP9X].
8. Marisa Schultz, British Politician Says Suspected Terrorists Should Be Put in Camps, N.Y. POST
(June 4, 2017, 6:32 PM), http://nypost.com/2017/06/04/british-politician-says-suspected-terroristsshould-be-put-in-camps/ [https://perma.cc/P4WU-4TPF].
9. Trump Ally Michael Savage Calls for “World War II-Style Internment Camps” Following London
Attack,
MEDIA
MATTERS
FOR
AM.
(June
5,
2017,
7:07
PM),
https://www.mediamatters.org/blog/2017/06/05/Trump-ally-Michael-Savage-calls-for-World-War-IIstyle-internment-camps-following-London-a/216792 [http://perma.cc/M53Q-8UVH].
10. Id.
11. Meghan Keneally, Donald Trump Cites These FDR Policies to Defend Muslim Ban, ABC NEWS
(Dec. 8, 2015, 1:01 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/donald-trump-cites-fdr-policies-defend-muslimban/story?id=35648128 [http://perma.cc/S6MC-8QNE]. When asked on a separate occasion, Trump
initially declined to denounce the Japanese-American internment but in subsequent interviews said that
he was not in favor of it. See Bever supra note 6.
12. Keneally, supra note 11.
13. Michael D. Shear et al., A List of Priorities from Trump, and Kris Kobach Tips His Hand, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/us/politics/donald-trump-transition.html
[https://perma.cc/TW6A-UTKJ].
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Obama in 2011.14 NSEERS required, on pain of significant criminal penalties, that
non-citizen immigrants traveling to the United States from certain countries undergo
a secondary inspection upon arrival in the U.S. and register at a designated port of
departure upon leaving the country, among other obligations. 15 DHS determined in
2011 that newly implemented automated systems obsoleted the NSEERS registration
process but decided to leave the underlying regulation in place until the regulation
was fully terminated in late 2016.16
Although the implementation of NSEERS from 2002 to 2011 did not result in a
single known terrorism conviction, 17 the registry has withstood equal protection
challenges on the grounds that Congress has broad power to determine, and delegate
the determination of, immigration criteria.18 In light of the existing case law, if DHS
were to re-implement NSEERS it seems likely that the program would withstand
constitutional challenge.19
Trump’s campaign statements, however, clearly contemplate something far
more sweeping than a registry for non-citizen immigrants from certain designated
countries. In November 2015, for example, Trump declined in an interview with
ABC News to rule out a database of all Muslims in the United States.20 This
proposal, which apparently contemplates a national tracking program applicable to
certain American citizens on the basis of their religion, is unprecedented in modern
American politics and has potentially enormous implications for civil liberties in the
United States. As an initial matter, Trump’s statements on this topic merit
examination to allow an estimate of what, precisely, the president has proposed.
A simple data set capturing nearly all Muslim Americans (as well as Americans
14. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS Removes Designated Countries from NSEERS Registration,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (May 2011), https://www.dhs.gov/dhs-removes-designatedcountries-nseers-registration-may-2011 [https://perma.cc/X446-FL92].
15. Id.
16. Id; see Kevin Liptak & Shachar Peled, Obama Administration Ending Program Once Used to
Track Mostly Arab and Muslim Men, CNN (5:34 PM GMT, December 22, 2016),
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/22/politics/obama-nseers-arab-muslim-registry/ [https://perma.cc/PX5DDQX2].
17. Chris Rickerd, Homeland Security Suspends Ineffective, Discriminatory Immigration Program,
AMERICAN
CIVIL
LIBERTIES
UNION
(May
6,
2011,
11:30
AM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakeasy/homeland-security-suspends-ineffective-discriminatoryimmigration-program [https://perma.cc/H7PG-PXP8].
18. See Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 73 (1st Cir. 2006) (“Every court to address the issue has
rejected a challenge to NSEERS registration on equal protection grounds.”) (citing Ahmed v. Gonzales,
447 F.3d 433, 439-40 (5th Cir. 2006); Ali v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 678, 681 n.4 (5th Cir. 2006); Zafar v.
U.S. Attorney Gen., 461 F.3d 1357, 1366-67 (11th Cir. 2006); Roudnahal v. Ridge, 310 F. Supp. 2d 884,
892 (N.D. Ohio 2003)); see also Louis Nelson, Trump’s Muslim Registry Wouldn’t Be Illegal,
(Nov.
17,
2016,
11:25
AM),
Constitutional
Law
Experts
Say,
POLITICO
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/donald-trump-muslim-registry-constitution-231527
[https://perma.cc/W6V5-M2YV].
19. Nelson, supra note 18. Alternatively, some argue that hostility toward Muslims evidenced by
Trump during the 2016 presidential campaign would provide compelling evidence that anti-Muslim
sentiment is behind the reconstitution of the NSEERS program, thus making the program an
unconstitutional exercise of religious discrimination for its own sake. See Michael Price & Faiza Patel,
Muslim Registry or NSEERS Reboot Would Be Unconstitutional, LAWFARE (Nov. 22, 2016, 12:45 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/muslim-registry-or-nseers-reboot-would-be-unconstitutional
[https://perma.cc/TLW2-FZBB].
20. Blake, supra note 2.
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of other religious affiliations) almost certainly exists already as a result of large scale
commercial data information-gathering, to say nothing of any non-public datacollection projects that government agencies may already have underway. 21 To be
of any significance, whatever Trump has proposed as a “Muslim registry” must
amount to more than an internal government effort to identify who, among American
residents, is Muslim. In fact, Trump himself agreed that Muslims would be “legally
obligated to sign into the database,”22 stating separately that it would be necessary
“to do certain things that were frankly unthinkable a year ago.”23 Trump’s vague
references to “surveillance” and “watch lists” and the precedent of NSEERS are
conceptually consistent with a proposal that would require Muslim Americans to
initially register and at the very least provide some form of current contact
information to the federal government. 24 Beyond this, the proposal may not have
any clear details in even in Trump’s own mind. As noted above, when asked how
his proposal differed from the registration obligations imposed on Jews in Nazi
Germany, Trump responded, “You tell me.”25 Asked repeatedly, he provided this
same response four times and then stopped answering the question. 26
In light of these facts, in discussing and analyzing the proposed “registry” or
“database,” this Article assumes that such a policy would require Muslims in the
United States to register with the program and that there would a penalty for
noncompliance.27 To emphasize that the proposal is not yet clearly defined, this
Article will refer to it as the “Muslim registry” in quotation marks.28 This is a
description used principally by journalists but not by the president himself.
The American Civil Liberties Union has published a relatively brief legal
analysis of a “Muslim registry” that conforms to these contours, arguing that it would
violate the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution as well as the Privacy Act
of 1974 and possibly other federal laws.29 However, considering that the President
of the United States continues to leave open the possibility of creating a registry of
all Muslims in the country, including American citizens, and considering that the
Trump Administration has apparently worked to fulfill one of the president’s other
campaign promises by implementing a travel ban applicable to citizens of several
21. Philip Bump, Just So You Know: The Government Already Has a List of Muslims in the U.S.,
WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/11/20/just-soyou-know-the-government-almost-certainly-already-has-a-list-of-muslims/
[https://perma.cc/7A59F22D].
22. Hillyard, supra note 2.
23. Tessa Berenson, Trump: U.S. May Have to Do ‘Unthinkable’ in Light of Paris Attacks, TIME
(Nov. 19, 2015), http://time.com/4120711/donald-trump-paris-attack-muslims/ [http://perma.cc/TE9FT2P7].
24. Blake, supra note 2.
25. Hillyard, supra note 2.
26. Id.
27. Alternatively, the policy might avoid explicit references to any specific religion in order to
increase its chances of surviving constitutional review. This “facially neutral” permutation of the policy
is discussed in detail in Part II.B.
28. At times throughout this Article the registry is referred to as a proposal, policy, or program, or a
hypothetical future law or regulation. Because the ultimate legal form of any future “Muslim registry” is
unknown, the terms are sometimes used interchangeably in reference to it.
29. AM.
CIVIL
LIBERTIES
UNION,
The
Trump
Memos,
https://action.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pages/trumpmemos.pdf [http://perma.cc/6P5F-BNKT].
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Muslim-majority nations (the “Immigration Ban”),30 there is surprisingly little
published, in-depth constitutional analysis of Trump’s proposal.
This Article attempts to provide such an analysis, reviewing in detail the
applicable constitutional inquiries and scrutinizing the most salient arguments for
and against constitutionality. Part II.A of this Article analyzes the constitutionality
of a “Muslim registry” that explicitly discriminates among religions and reaches the
conclusion (likely unsurprising to most readers) that such a policy would
unequivocally violate the First and Fifth Amendments. Part II.B and Part III.A
confront the somewhat more complicated questions, respectively, of whether a
“Muslim registry” disguised to be neutral among religions could survive
constitutional review, and whether the emergency powers of the president could
authorize such a policy. Part III.B analyzes whether the Japanese-American
internment, in light of its citation by certain Trump backers as precedent for Trump’s
proposed ban on Muslim immigration, provides any legal authority to support the
constitutionality of a “Muslim registry.” Part III.C briefly analyzes some additional,
specious arguments that might be marshalled in support of the registry. This Article
ultimately concludes in Part IV that, even recognizing that the policy might be
structured to appear facially neutral and justified as a purportedly necessary use of
emergency executive power, the “Muslim registry” would be unconstitutional. In
short, President Trump has advocated for, and now refuses to disavow, a policy that
would overtly violate the constitutional rights of American citizens.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. The Constitutionality of a Religious Registry that Explicitly Targets Muslims in
the United States
An attempt by the federal government to create a registration system explicitly
targeting Muslims in the United States would clash squarely with decades of
Supreme Court jurisprudence applying the First and Fifth Amendments. 31 Indeed,
the basic constitutional challenges to such a policy would be so straightforward that
it is hard to imagine proponents of the “Muslim registry” implementing a program
that openly discriminates among citizens on religious grounds if for no other reason
than strategic considerations. Nonetheless, because President Trump has so far
declined to reject this possibility outright, there is value in explicating the
constitutional deficiencies of such a policy.
1. Constitutionality Under the First Amendment
The creation of the “Muslim registry” would contravene both the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Establishment
Clause provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
30. Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 20, 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017). The order suspended immigration
from seven Muslim-majority countries.
31. Regardless of whether the “registry” is created by legislation, administrative action, or executive
order, the same constitutional issues arise. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972) (“State
action, for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, may emanate from rulings of administrative and
regulatory agencies as well as from legislative or judicial action.”).
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religion” while the Free Exercise Clause is the second portion of this sentence: “or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”32 The Establishment Clause means “at least”
that the federal government cannot “pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another” or “force [or] influence a person to . .
. profess a belief or disbelief in any religion” and “[n]o person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs.”33 Furthermore, any law
that creates “a denominational preference” is subject to strict scrutiny under the
Establishment Clause.34
Any government policy that singles out Muslim Americans for certain unique
obligations (such as current reporting of one’s residential address and other
information as was required by NSEERS) would represent an obvious
“denominational preference” against Islam. This would trigger an analysis under
strict scrutiny, meaning that to be consistent with the Establishment Clause any
“Muslim registry” would need to be “closely fitted” to “a compelling governmental
interest.”35 As explained below, it is virtually inconceivable that the registry could
survive a strict scrutiny analysis.
The Establishment Clause creates an additional problem for this policy. From a
practical standpoint, it would be impossible to enforce any mandatory registration
requirement in an overt “Muslim registry” without effectively compelling certain
Americans to declare themselves to be Muslim. Although this additional problem
may be somewhat counterintuitive, there is a strong argument that government action
in this case would amount to “forc[ing] . . . a person to . . . profess a belief . . . in”
Islam.36 This too would violate the Establishment Clause.37
The Free Exercise Clause presents yet another problem for Trump’s proposal.
Regulating or burdening religious expression is permitted under the Free Exercise
Clause when “[t]he conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed some
substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.”38 However, to avoid strict
scrutiny, such regulations must be “neutral and of general applicability.”39 To create
a “Muslim registry” remotely consistent with what Trump has proposed, at the very
least Americans who publicly identify as Muslims would have to be required to
register with an administrative or law enforcement agency. Presumably Americans
who choose to worship at a mosque would also be targeted, regardless of whether

32. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
33. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Tp., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
34. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982).
35. Id. at 247.
36. For example, if the government believes that an individual is a Muslim and is required to register
for the program, on what basis can it challenge that individual’s refusal to register? What if the individual
argues that his religious beliefs, although drawing inspiration from Islam, cannot be reduced to a label as
simple as “Muslim”? Any attempt at punishment for noncompliance in this context would both create a
discriminatory burden on the basis of religion and also constitute a demand that certain persons selfidentify as adherents of a particular religious faith. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
37. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000).
38. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
39. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 521 (1993).
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they identify as Muslim.40 But the act of publicly identifying oneself as a member
of a particular religion, let alone attending a house of worship, is unquestionably an
act of religious expression, perhaps commonplace and simple but also profoundly
meaningful to many people.41 Any such registry (which by its nature would not be
“neutral and of general applicability” across religions) should face strict scrutiny not
only under the Establishment Clause but also as a burden imposed on those who
exercise the religious expression of publicly identifying as Muslim. If so, the
program would be lawful under the Free Exercise Clause only if it were “narrowly
tailored to advance” a “compelling governmental interest.”42 Regarding the requisite
governmental interest, “(o)nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interest,
give occasion for permissible limitation” on religious freedom guaranteed by the
Free Exercise Clause.43
Accordingly, as for its legality under the First Amendment, the question
becomes whether the “Muslim registry” could withstand strict scrutiny under both
the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Again, to survive this review
in each case, the registry would need to satisfy two requirements. First, it would
need to be supported by a “compelling governmental interest.”44 Second, in the case
of the Establishment Clause, the “denominational preference” granted to religions
other than Islam must be “narrowly tailored” to the applicable governmental interest,
and, in the case of the Free Exercise Clause, the discriminatory restriction on the free
religious expression of American Muslims would need to be narrowly tailored to that
interest.45
Would the registry be supported by a “compelling governmental interest”?
Given that the discussion of Trump’s proposal has not yet progressed beyond
ambiguous and sometimes contradictory public statements, the best inference one
can make as to its purported justification is based on the vague contours of the
proposal itself: “basically that radical Islam poses such a threat that Muslims—
irrespective of their potential ties to extremism—should be on some kind of registry
so they can be tracked.”46 This sort of explanation would also be consistent with

40. The hypotheticals are potentially limitless and thus of limited utility, but it is hard to see how a
“Muslim registry” could be anything of the sort without at least these requirements.
41. See, e.g., Note, Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion: A Subjective Alternative, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1258, 1268 (1989) (“The Seeger Court’s deference to subjective definitions of religion reflects the
constitutional status of an individual’s right to form religious conceptions without government
interference. This protected autonomy is in turn informed by the special relationship between religious
affiliation and personal identity. Religious beliefs help individuals in ordering their lives and determine
how they participate in the community. Like racial and ethnic affiliations, religious beliefs may intimately
shape outlooks on life. Religion is so central that religious frictions may be at the core of many intergroup
hostilities. Indeed, the Court has acknowledged the role of religious liberties in reducing social strife and
has arguably elevated religious affiliation to a protected status even higher than free speech.” (citations
omitted)).
42. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 521.
43. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
44. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 521.
45. Id.; see also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 247 (1982).
46. Blake, supra note 2.
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Trump’s public statements with respect to his Immigration Ban. 47 In the event that
a registry is actually created, the legislative history and other aspects of its creation
would need to be analyzed together with the other relevant facts and circumstances
to make a judgment as to the governmental interest at stake. 48
It is virtually guaranteed that the architects of any future “Muslim registry”
would endeavor to provide the relevant legislation and executive actions with at least
a patina of non-discriminatory intent for both political expediency and as a defense
against future legal challenges. Because the actual policymaking process has not yet
occurred with respect to any religious registry, this Article will assume that if such a
policy were enacted the policymakers would justify it on the basis of national
security, similar to President Trump’s Immigration Ban.49 If courts were to accept
this justification as accurate, it would almost certainly qualify as “compelling.”50
Notably, it is far from clear that courts would uncritically accept a national security
justification asserted by the executive. First, the inquiry as to whether a policy was
truly motivated by the claimed governmental interest may at times overlap with the
analysis of whether the policy is in fact narrowly tailored. 51 Second, courts have
been atypically skeptical of the purported national security rationale for the
Immigration Ban, apparently reflecting in part an unstated hesitancy of the judiciary
to apply a strong presumption of non-discriminatory intent to the president’s actions
vis-à-vis Muslims.52
In any event, assuming that the governmental interest at stake were indeed the
protection of national security, would a “Muslim registry” be narrowly tailored to
achieve this governmental interest, both in terms of the “denominational preference”
against Islam and the restriction on each individual’s freedom to choose a religious
identity and place of worship?
47. Adam Liptak, Court Refuses to Reinstate Travel Ban, Dealing Trump Another Legal Loss, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/us/politics/appeals-court-trump-travelban.html [http://perma.cc/6DLS-6PJ7].
48. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 540 (“Here, as in equal protection cases, we may determine the
city council’s object from both direct and circumstantial evidence. Relevant evidence includes, among
other things, the historical background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of events leading
to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history, including
contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking body.” (citations omitted)).
49. Liptak, supra note 47.
50. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1330 (2007) (“If the
question is whether there is a compelling interest in avoiding a catastrophic terrorist attack, the answer is
obviously yes.”).
51. See id. at 1327; see also infra Part II.B (discussing the analysis of the intent behind a facially
neutral law).
52. The third iteration of the Immigration Ban became subject to a temporary restraining order in
October 2017. Hawaii v. Trump, No. C17-1700050 DKW-KSC at 25-33 (D. Haw. Oct. 17, 2017); see
also Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017);
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir.), reconsideration en banc denied, 853 F.3d 933 (9th Cir.
2017), and reconsideration en banc denied, 858 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017); Benjamin Wittes & Quinta
Jurecic, What Happens When We Don’t Believe the President’s Oath?, LAWFARE (Mar. 3, 2017, 12:30
PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-happens-when-we-dont-believe-presidents-oath
[http://perma.cc/P4JX-VJWQ]; Benjamin Wittes, Malevolence Tempered by Incompetence: Trump’s
Horrifying Executive Order on Refugees and Visas, LAWFARE (Jan. 28, 2017, 10:58 PM),
https://lawfareblog.com/malevolence-tempered-incompetence-trumps-horrifying-executive-orderrefugees-and-visas [http://perma.cc/2J4N-ZQW8].
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Relevant statistical evidence provides a clear and simple basis for the narrow
tailoring inquiry. A 2017 analysis from the New America Foundation put the total
number of “individuals who are charged with or died engaging in jihadist terrorism
or related activities inside the United States, and Americans accused of such activity
abroad” from 2015 through 2016 at 123, or just above sixty per year. 53 This is
consistent with similar research; during roughly the same period, former FBI analyst
Nora Ellingsen found that “the FBI has arrested and charged ninety-seven
counterterrorism subjects during the past two years,”54 while a 2015 report on
Muslim American terrorism suspects and perpetrators published by the Triangle
Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security found that a total of eighty-one Muslim
Americans were associated with violent extremist plots in 2015.55 The Pew Research
Center estimates the total number of Muslims living in the United States at
approximately 3.3 million.56 Based on these numbers, a rough estimate suggests that
about one out of every 45,000 Muslim Americans or Muslim U.S. residents is
associated with a violent extremist plot in a given year. That is, in a given year, a
“Muslim registry” would impose a burden on tens of thousands of innocent
American citizens and residents for each terrorist-affiliated person affected by the
policy.
Considering these numbers, even putting aside serious and legitimate doubts
about the efficacy of a registry, it is abundantly clear that a blanket registration
requirement targeting all Muslim Americans would not be “closely fitted” to the goal
of enhancing national security. Furthermore, strict scrutiny case law is consistent
with the concept that broad restrictions or obligations applied in a discriminatory
fashion do not meet the narrow tailoring requirement. 57 Although the narrow
tailoring analysis is multifaceted, complex, and not without a measure of ambiguity,
53. Peter
Bergen
et
al.,
Terrorism
Cases:
2001-Today,
NEW
AMERICA,
https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/part-i-overview-terrorism-cases-2001-today/
[http://perma.cc/B8H5-5VRB]. New America’s research demonstrates that some of these persons are not
U.S. citizens, so the actual number of Muslim Americans determined to be engaged in jihadist terrorism
would be somewhat lower. See Peter Bergen, et al., Who Are The Terrorists?, NEW AMERICA,
https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/who-are-terrorists/ [http://perma.cc/9TXTNQEA].
54. Nora Ellingsen, It’s Not Foreigners Who Are Plotting Here: What the Data Really Show,
LAWFARE (Feb. 7, 2017, 8:48 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/its-not-foreigners-who-are-plotting-herewhat-data-really-show [http://perma.cc/VE5F-HQSD].
55. CHARLES KURZMAN, TRIANGLE CTR. ON TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SEC., MUSLIM-AMERICAN
INVOLVEMENT
WITH
VIOLENT
EXTREMISM,
2015,
at
2
(2016),
https://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2016/02/Kurzman_MuslimAmerican_Involvement_in_Violent_Extremism_2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/WW6Z-ZGKS].
56. Besheer Mohamed, A New Estimate of the U.S. Muslim Population, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 6,
2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/01/06/a-new-estimate-of-the-u-s-muslim-population/
[http://perma.cc/AF3B-URTY].
57. Professor Richard Fallon has distilled the narrow tailoring inquiry into three, or sometimes four,
component parts, which are essentially: (1) the infringement must be necessary to achieve the relevant
governmental interest; (2) the infringement must not be underinclusive to the extent that the
underinclusivity extinguishes the credibility of the government’s purported rationale; (3) the infringement
must not be excessively overinclusive (and this criterion may be violated even if the infringement is
necessary to achieve the relevant government interest); and (4) the policy must satisfy a proportional
assessment of the under- or over-inclusiveness of the infringement, the governmental interests at stake,
the likelihood of success of the challenged law, and the availability of alternative measures. See Fallon,
supra note 50, at 1326-30.
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it mandates intense skepticism of policies that are overinclusive or that offer meager
benefits in proportion to the scale of constitutional rights infringed. 58 In respect of
this “proportionality” requirement, the “question becomes whether a particular,
incremental reduction in risk justifies a particular infringement of protected rights in
light of other reasonably available, more or less costly and more or less effective,
alternatives.”59 In other words, the narrow tailoring inquiry is quite searching and
includes a detailed consideration of possible alternative policies that could advance
the governmental interest at stake.60
In light of the enormous array of possible measures available to strengthen
national security61 (or even, as proponents of the “Muslim registry” might phrase it,
achieve a more narrowly articulated goal of “strengthening national security against
the threat of Islamic terrorism”), and given the fact that the registry-style NSEERS
program resulted in zero known terrorism-related convictions during its nearly ten
years in effect,62 the government would be hard-pressed to demonstrate that “no
alternative forms of regulation” could achieve its purported goal.63
By its nature, any review of a government policy under strict scrutiny will be
highly fact-dependent, but under virtually all conceivable circumstances an overtly
discriminatory “Muslim registry” would clearly violate the narrow tailoring
requirement due to its extremely overbroad nature and thus fail constitutional
review.64 Furthermore, to avoid widespread non-compliance, the program would
surely be mandatory under threat of civil or criminal penalties—but the harsher the
punishments for non-compliance, the more severe the discriminatory, governmentsanctioned burden on one particular religion. This presents a problem for registry
proponents in light of the proportionality analysis: the very mechanisms by which
the government would attempt to ensure that the registry is functional and accurate
would strengthen the argument that the policy was unconstitutional due to its
application of an onerous, overbroad burden on members of one specific religion.

58. Id. at 1328-31.
59. Id. at 1331.
60. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316-18 (1978) (comparing other
university admissions programs to determine if the University of California’s affirmative action program
was truly narrowly tailored to promote a diverse student body); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
407 (1963) (stating that even if the government interest at stake were compelling, to survive constitutional
review “it would plainly be incumbent upon the [government] to demonstrate that no alternative forms of
regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights.”).
61. Take, for example, the “community-policing approach.” Preventing Terrorism and Countering
Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach,
ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE (Mar. 17, 2014),
http://www.osce.org/atu/111438 [http://perma.cc/3TU5-SFTA].
62. In another recent program with some similarities, the New York City Police Department ran “a
secretive program that dispatched plainclothes detectives into Muslim neighborhoods to eavesdrop on
conversations” for years, but the efforts did not lead to even one instance of terrorism charges. Matt
Apuzzo & Joseph Goldstein, New York Drops Unit that Spied on Muslims, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/nyregion/police-unit-that-spied-on-muslims-is-disbanded.html
[http://perma.cc/ZL7J-VFED].
63. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
64. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993);
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246-51 (1982).
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2. Constitutionality Under the Fifth Amendment
In addition to triggering strict scrutiny under the First Amendment, the “Muslim
registry” would also be subject to heightened scrutiny under the equal protection
principles of the Fifth Amendment.65 Indeed, the key elements of the policy that
would trigger strict scrutiny under the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise
Clause also create critical problems for the proposal under equal protection: first, a
“Muslim registry” would impose a significant, possibly very onerous, burden on
members of one religion but not others; second, Muslim Americans—and Muslim
Americans alone—would be effectively forced to declare their religious faith to the
government and punished for not doing so.66
A mandatory registry applicable only to adherents of a single religion is exactly
the type of governmental action the equal protection doctrine is designed to guard
against, allowing such measures only in a strictly limited set of exceptional
circumstances. Indeed, the Supreme Court has identified “race, religion, [and]
alienage” as “inherently suspect distinctions” for government regulation.67
This is no new development; the inclusion of religion as a suspect legislative
classification that may deserve additional scrutiny dates at least as far back as 1938,
to Carolene Products,68 and even casual students of American history know that the
political and legal enshrinement of religious freedom can be traced back to the
founding of the United States.69 A consequence of this long line of political history
and jurisprudence is that a law that prefers certain religions over others will be
65. See, e.g., Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 299-301 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[E]ven before
Carolene Products, the Court considered religious discrimination to be a classic example of ‘a denial of
the equal protection of the laws to the less favored classes.’” (quoting Am. Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana,
179 U.S. 89, 92 (1900))). Although equal protection claims are rarely used by litigants alleging religious
discrimination, there is a compelling argument that they could and should be used more frequently in this
context, especially in cases where state action marginalizes religious minorities. See Susan Gellman &
Susan Looper-Friedman, Thou Shalt Use the Equal Protection Clause for Religion Cases (Not Just the
Establishment Clause), 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 665, 666 (May 2008).
66. See, e.g., Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 540 (1993) (noting that “[i]n determining if the object
of a law is a neutral one under the Free Exercise Clause, [the Court] can also find guidance in [its] equal
protection cases.”); Hassan, 804 F.3d at 294 (stating a policy that “‘by its own terms’ singles out Muslims
‘for different treatment’” would be the basis for an equal protection claim (quoting RONALD D. ROTUNDA
& JOHN E. NOWAK, 3 TREATISE ON CONST. L. § 18.4 (10th ed. 2012))).
67. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). A registry for Muslim Americans would
qualify as discriminatory on equal protection grounds simply by virtue of its classification of people based
on religious faith. See, e.g., Hayden v. Cty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[A] law or policy
is discriminatory on its face if it expressly classifies persons on the basis of race or gender.”); Hassan,
804 F.3d at 294. In the equal protection context, Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is directly
informative and enriches the base of case law for evaluation under the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g.,
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (“Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the
same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.”), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized by McConnell v. Fed. Election. Comm’n,
540 U.S. 93 (2003).
68. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (“Nor need we enquire whether
similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious . . . or national . . .
or racial minorities.” (citation omitted)). The Third Circuit has traced conceptually similar jurisprudence
back to 1877. Hassan, 804 F.3d at 300 (citing Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485, 505, 24 L. Ed. 547 (1877)).
69. See, e.g., Larson, 456 U.S. at 245 (“[James] Madison once noted: ‘Security for civil rights must
be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests and in the
other in the multiplicity of sects.’” (citing The Federalist No. 51, p. 326 (H. Lodge ed. 1908))).
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subject to heightened scrutiny, most likely strict scrutiny,70 under the doctrine of
equal protection.71 The basic elements of the strict scrutiny review under equal
protection are the same as those under the First Amendment: the law will be adjudged
constitutional only if “narrowly tailored” to “further compelling governmental
interests.”72 Would a registry or database of Muslim Americans satisfy this test in
the equal protection context?
Case law provides an answer: clearly not. To reach this conclusion first requires
consideration of the purpose of the government policy in question. As noted above
in Part II.A.1, there is admittedly a good deal of guesswork involved in performing
this analysis when the policy has not evolved beyond vague, inchoate proposals.
Nonetheless, consistent with the First Amendment analysis in Part II.A.1, for the
purposes of the equal protection analysis this Article will assume that the government
would claim the registry is designed to strengthen national security. If this assertion
were accepted by the reviewing court, the policy would surely satisfy the
“compelling governmental interest” prong of the inquiry. 73
The next inquiry becomes whether the policy is narrowly tailored in the equal
protection context to strengthen national security. 74 This is not a hard question.
Considering that just tens out of millions of Muslim Americans are associated with
a violent extremist plot in a given year, a broadly applicable “Muslim registry” would
not come close to satisfying the narrow tailoring requirement. Ultimately, the fact
that only a tiny number of Muslim Americans are involved in extremist violence is
a fundamental problem for any “Muslim registry” under not only the First but also
the Fifth Amendment.
For a recent example of strict scrutiny applied in the equal protection context,
consider that a university’s policy of providing “one-fifth of the points needed to
guarantee admission” to certain applicants on the basis of race was not “narrowly
tailored” to the goal of “diversity” and thus violated equal protection principally
because it did not provide “individualized consideration” to each applicant.75
Admittedly, there are major and important distinctions between a case in the
70. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (stating that strict scrutiny
is required for a law that “operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a
fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution . . . .”); United States v. Brown,
352 F.3d 654, 668 (2d Cir. 2003) (analyzing a religious discrimination-based equal protection claim in
the Batson context and noting that “religious classifications, concededly, trigger strict scrutiny.”).
71. The Supreme Court has not clarified the precise level of scrutiny applicable to a policy that
discriminates among religions when challenged on an equal protection basis, though some measure of
heightened scrutiny should apply. See, e.g., Hassan, 804 F.3d at 300-01 (“We also are guided by other
appellate courts that have subjected religious-based classifications to heightened scrutiny . . . . Today we
join these courts and hold that intentional discrimination based on religious affiliation must survive
heightened equal-protection review.”).
72. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515
U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
73. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993); Larson
v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 247 (1982).
74. Proponents of the “Muslim registry” might look (and some likely already have looked) to
Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), as support for the contention that equal protection will not provide a
defense if the government acts to further national security even when the action discriminates against
protected classes. This is a flawed argument that is addressed in Part III.B.
75. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270-71 (2003).
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university context and the analysis that would apply to a “Muslim registry.”76
Nonetheless, this example is revealing of the intrusive and stringent standard that
applies when a policy that discriminates across protected classes is challenged on
equal protection grounds. If a hard (rather than soft) admissions boost for college
applicants is not “narrowly tailored” to achieve diversity, it is hard to believe that a
religious-based registration and reporting obligation applicable to millions of lawabiding Americans could be narrowly tailored to strengthen national security in such
a way that justifies the discriminatory infringement of a core constitutional right.
In addition to being overbroad, considerations of efficacy present another
problem in both the First Amendment and equal protection contexts. In short, there
is little evidence that creating a registration and reporting obligation would promote
national security.77 Because in practice the narrow tailoring requirement examines
whether the benefit of the challenged governmental action is proportional to the harm
caused by the infringement of protected rights, in a strict scrutiny analysis “one must
deal in probabilities by attempting to assess how great a risk currently exists and how
much reduction in that risk particular proposed measures would likely achieve.”78
For an extremely broad policy that discriminates on the basis of a protected class and
whose closest analogs have failed to yield tangible results, strict scrutiny is an
insurmountable hurdle, at least as long as the analysis hews to recent precedent.
3. Conclusion as to Constitutionality of an Explicitly Discriminatory
“Muslim Registry”
In accordance with the above analysis, even assuming that the implementation
of a future “Muslim registry” were successfully defended as a response to genuine
concerns about national security rather than a manifestation of religious animus, the
overbroad nature of such a program virtually ensures that it would violate both the
First and Fifth Amendments regardless of its precise structure. Indeed, the
constitutional deficiencies are so glaring that it is hard to imagine proponents of the
policy endorsing such an explicitly discriminatory approach. Nonetheless, this
baseline analysis is informative because it demonstrates the constitutional
impediments to the policy, in its most basic terms, as proposed by the President of
the United States. If some future policymakers attempt to turn this proposal into a
reality while making constitutional accommodations—avoiding specific references
to any particular religion, for example—the resulting policy would be a disguised
76. First, the current interpretation of equal protection in the race context is generally less supportive
of government policies to enforce equal outcomes than the current interpretations of the First Amendment
and equal protection in the religion context. See Joy Milligan, Religion and Race: On Duality and
Entrenchment, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 393, 453-59 (2012). Second, the goal of diversifying a university
student body and the goal of protecting the United States from domestic terrorism clearly occupy different
planes of urgency and necessity, and this would surely influence the proportionality considerations that
form part of the strict scrutiny inquiry.
77. NSEERS, the most closely analogous domestic program, did not result in even one terrorism
conviction and may have hindered counterterrorism efforts by making it more difficult for law
enforcement to work with immigrant communities. See Nadeem Muaddi, The Bush-Era Muslim Registry
Failed. Yet the US Could Be Trying It Again, CNN (Dec. 22, 2016, 4:30 PM),
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/18/politics/nseers-muslim-database-qa-trnd/
[https://perma.cc/MBH97Q6W].
78. Fallon, supra note 51, at 1330-31.
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effort to achieve the goals of openly discriminatory and unconstitutional proposal
through other means.
How might proponents of the “Muslim registry” attempt to increase its chances
of surviving judicial review? Without diving too deep into a potentially endless list
of hypotheticals, there are two obvious tactics that proponents of the “Muslim
registry” might attempt to utilize: first, an ostensibly non-discriminatory structure
for the registry that would attempt to avoid the application of strict scrutiny, and
second, an extraordinary justification, such as a purported national security crisis, to
distinguish this policy from other acts of religious discrimination that have been
found unconstitutional. The following Part II.B examines the former, while Part
III.A examines the latter.
B. The Constitutionality of a “National Security Registry” that Purports to Be
Neutral Among Religions
1. Overview
One alternative approach available to proponents of the “Muslim registry” is to
create a registration or reporting obligation for certain individuals that does not
directly reference any religion but nonetheless falls disproportionately on Muslim
Americans. Notably, this sort of registry would be less overtly discriminatory than
what President Trump has endorsed, as his public statements have explicitly
identified Muslims as the targets of the policy. 79 In any event, compelling evidence
suggests that Trump used a similar approach to effect his proposed “Muslim ban”
without making specific reference to religion. 80 It is possible that policymakers
could use this tactic again in an attempt to create a program that is a “Muslim
registry” in deed but not in word.81 In fact, the ACLU anticipated this possibility in
its 2016 analysis of Trump’s policy proposals and argued briefly that such a policy
would likely fail constitutional review.82 This Article provides a more detailed
analysis.
As a general principle, a government policy “that is neutral and of general
applicability” among religions will not be subject to strict scrutiny under the First
Amendment and equal protection principles.83 However, this requirement may be
79. See Hillyard, supra note 2.
80. Amy B. Wang, Trump Asked for a ‘Muslim Ban,’ Giuliani Says — and Ordered a Commission to
Do It ‘Legally’, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2017/01/29/trump-asked-for-a-muslim-ban-giuliani-says-and-ordered-a-commission-to-do-itlegally/ [https://perma.cc/8P69-4H7B].
81. Discriminating on the basis of national origin instead of religion would not help the “Muslim
registry” avoid strict scrutiny. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“Strict scrutiny, we have said, is reserved for state ‘classifications based on race or national
origin and classifications affecting fundamental rights,’” (quoting Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461
(1988))).
82. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE TRUMP MEMOS 3, 12 n.63 (2016),
https://action.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pages/trumpmemos.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJ6C-ZHAJ].
83. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993). Recent
trends in First Amendment and equal protection jurisprudence also reveal some measure of increased
emphasis on the fulfillment of this formalistic requirement over substantive neutrality. See Milligan, supra
note 76, at 431-40.
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harder to satisfy than it appears. Even without explicit references to religion, there
are several ways in which legislation or directives creating a “Muslim registry” could
run afoul of the Constitution or trigger a strict scrutiny inquiry that would very likely
result in the policy being ruled unconstitutional. First, even when the drafters of a
law believe it is facially neutral and the law does not reference any specific religions,
the law may still not be facially neutral for First Amendment purposes.84 Second, a
law that is facially neutral may not actually be “neutral” for strict scrutiny purposes
if the policymakers intended that the law effectively discriminate among religions. 85
Third, even a law that is neutral will be subject to heightened scrutiny if its
“enforcement target[s] the practices of a particular religion for discriminatory
treatment.”86 Finally, a law that has a discriminatory effect and is motivated by
“discriminatory animus” on the basis of religion would also be extremely vulnerable
to constitutional challenge.87
Although the analysis in Section II.A above reviews the proposal for an overtly
discriminatory “Muslim registry” from discrete First Amendment and equal
protection perspectives, this section will focus more generally on whether a facially
neutral law would be likely to trigger strict scrutiny under either the First or Fifth
Amendments or suffer some other constitutional failure. 88 Notably, although cases
addressing actual or alleged racial discrimination occupy a dominant role in strict
scrutiny jurisprudence under the equal protection doctrine,89 an examination of
recent case law suggests that the Court tends to take a more substantive and less
formalistic approach to questions of religious discrimination as compared to racial
discrimination.90 In other words, those who believe that a “Muslim registry” could
withstand review under equal protection principles, if sufficiently disguised as a
neutral policy, may be taking false comfort from inapposite precedents.

84. The Court has found in at least one prior case that even a law which did not distinguish between
religions was not facially neutral for First Amendment purposes because it nonetheless distinguished
between the “characteristics” of religions. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982). This is
discussed in more detail below.
85. See Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 557. Notably, in this case the ordinances in question
“implicate[d] . . . legitimate concerns” other than “religious animosity” but were nonetheless found to
have the object of discriminating among religions, meaning that the ordinances were not “neutral” and
were therefore subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 535, 546.
86. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also Walz v. Tax Comm’n of
City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (“The Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of
governmental categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders.”).
87. Jana-Rock Const., Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Econ. Dev., 438 F.3d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 2006)
(noting, in the context of another suspect class (race), that “[g]overnment action also violates principles
of equal protection ‘if it was motivated by discriminatory animus and its application results in a
discriminatory effect.’” (citation omitted)).
88. From a practical standpoint, triggering strict scrutiny under any circumstances would almost
certainly doom the “Muslim registry.” See supra Part II.A.
89. This may be in part because litigants alleging religious discrimination overwhelmingly choose to
rely on the First Amendment. Gellman & Looper-Friedman, supra note 65, at 666.
90. See Milligan, supra note 76, at 453-59. For a clear summary of the difficulty of proving ambiguity
surrounding discriminatory intent in the race context, see Julia Kobick, Discriminatory Intent
Reconsidered: Folk Concepts of Intentionality and Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 517, 517-40 (2010).
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2. Demonstrating Facial Neutrality Can Be Difficult
Depending on the structure of the “Muslim registry,” challengers may question
whether the law is in fact facially neutral at all, as even laws that appear neutral with
respect to specific religious faiths can run afoul of the Establishment Clause by
distinguishing among different characteristics of religions in their effect.91 It is not
hard to imagine that a purportedly neutral law designed to apply to Muslim
Americans could stumble over this tripwire. Indeed, by its very nature, a law that
tries to backdoor distinctions among faiths is likely to become one of the “religious
gerrymanders” that the Court has sought to discover and invalidate in past First
Amendment cases.92 If the policy lacks facial neutrality, it will be subject to strict
scrutiny and almost certainly fail constitutional review.
3. Neutrality of Intention May Be Required to Avoid Strict Scrutiny
Although “facial neutrality” is the commonly used term of art in this context, it
may be somewhat misleading. Case law suggests that a law can only avoid strict
scrutiny on the basis of neutrality if its “object,” as well as its text, is neutral among
religions.93 Admittedly, this inquiry into whether the object of a law is neutral may
bleed together somewhat with the inquiry described in Section II.B.2 above as to
whether a law is truly facially neutral. However, the former focuses on the intent of
the law, while the latter is based on the law’s text.
The upshot of this precedent is that a policy that has as its aim the creation of a
registry of all members of a particular religion, even if textually neutral, may not be
sufficiently “neutral” to avoid the application of strict scrutiny. Importantly, this
inquiry into the “object” of the law is distinct from an inquiry into whether the
enforcement of the law is discriminatory, and an intention to discriminate on the
basis of religion is sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny. 94

91. This principle has not been elucidated in a clear statement of doctrine by the Supreme Court, but
a few examples exist. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 248 n.23 (1982) (finding that a Minnesota
law imposing certain obligations on religious organizations that solicit more than 50% of their funding
from nonmembers was “not simply a facially neutral statute” but rather that it “ma[de] explicit and
deliberate distinctions between different religious organizations.”). In Larson, the Court determined that
the law “grants denominational preferences” and applied strict scrutiny, finding that the law violated the
establishment clause. Id. at 246-55. See also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (finding
that a tax on door-to-door solicitations of certain goods violated the First Amendment’s guarantees of
freedom of press, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion when used to fine Jehovah’s Witnesses for
refusing to pay a tax for soliciting donations in exchange for books and pamphlets and noting that if the
Court were to find the tax constitutional, “a new device for the suppression of religious minorities will
have been found,” despite the law being facially neutral).
92. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (“The Court must survey
meticulously the circumstances of governmental categories to eliminate, as it were, religious
gerrymanders.”).
93. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. 520, 540-42 (1993) (stating that a review of circumstantial evidence
“reveal[ed]” that the textually neutral law in question was motivated by discriminatory animus). See also
id. at 521 (“The ordinances’ texts and operation demonstrate that they are not neutral, but have as their
object the suppression of Santeria’s central element, animal sacrifice.”).
94. Id. at 533 (“[I]f the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious
motivation, the law is not neutral . . . and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is
narrowly tailored to advance that interest. There are, of course, many ways of demonstrating that the
object or purpose of a law is the suppression of religion or religious conduct.” (citations omitted)).
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Any future “Muslim registry” designed to avoid explicit discrimination among
religions would almost certainly be ruled unconstitutional unless it can satisfy the
searching and stringent requirements of neutrality that the Court has explicated in
prior cases. However, it is difficult to envision how a policy could both satisfy the
neutrality requirements and effectively operate as a “Muslim registry.” Case law
demonstrates that a significant measure of substantive neutrality is required to avoid
strict scrutiny, but the more thoroughly the policy satisfies this requirement, the less
it will operate as a “Muslim registry.”
4. Discriminatory Enforcement May Also Trigger Strict Scrutiny
Another way that proponents of a “Muslim registry” might attempt to create
such a program without explicitly discriminating among religions would be to create
a policy that is fully neutral in text but enforced selectively against Muslim
Americans. The ACLU anticipated this approach, writing that “even a facially
neutral law or policy that applied to American Muslims with a greater degree of
severity than it did to other religious groups, or that intentionally had an adverse
effect on Muslims, would also violate the Constitution’s guarantee of equal
protection.”95 There are many possible permutations of discriminatory enforcement,
but regardless of means, the government’s ends would be effectively requiring that
Muslim Americans (and generally not others) become subject to the requirements of
the registry. If those ends are not achieved, the policy would not be a “Muslim
registry” consistent with what President Trump has proposed.
Selective prosecution against Muslim Americans who decline to comply with
the requirements of the law would clearly violate the Constitution on equal protection
grounds.96
Similarly, discriminatory enforcement against Muslims by an
administrative agency on the basis of authority granted by a facially neutral law
would create the same equal protection problems. 97 Case law demonstrates that this
sort of discriminatory regulatory regime should subject the administrative action to
strict scrutiny under the First Amendment.98
95. ACLU, supra note 82, at 12 n.63 (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Met. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886); Jana-Rock Constr. v. N.Y.
State Dep’t of Econ. Dev., 438 F.3d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 2006)). See also Hayden v. Cty. of Nassau, 180
F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[A] facially neutral statute violates equal protection if it was motivated by
discriminatory animus and its application results in a discriminatory effect.”).
96. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953) (finding that a Jehovah’s Witness minister’s arrest
for a public address under a city ordinance in Rhode Island, when Catholic worshippers were allowed to
conduct the same activity without issue, violated the Constitution. The Court’s analysis cites both the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, with a slightly greater focus on the First Amendment.); see also United
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (“[T]he decision whether to prosecute may not be based
on ‘an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification’” (quoting Oyler v.
Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962))).
97. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972) (“State action, for purposes of the Equal
Protection Clause, may emanate from rulings of administrative and regulatory agencies as well as from
legislative or judicial action.”). A policy of discriminatory enforcement, assuming it can be demonstrated,
would therefore trigger heightened scrutiny just as would explicit discrimination.
98. If the “object” of the administrative actions were demonstrably not “neutral” as to religion, then
the de facto discriminatory policy should be subject to strict scrutiny. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at
533 (1993); see also id. at 524, 531 (stating that a policy will not be “neutral and of general applicability”
if “the secular ends asserted in defense of the laws [are] pursued only with respect to conduct motivated
by religious beliefs.”); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 314 (1951) (finding a New York ordinance
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5. Significant Discriminatory Animus Among Policymakers Could Create Fatal
Constitutional Problems
Any “Muslim registry” is also likely to be challenged with claims that its
creation was motivated by discriminatory animus against Muslims. For example,
litigants challenging President Trump’s initial Immigration Ban have already argued
with some success that anti-Muslim animus motivated the order and it thus violates
the First and Fifth Amendments.99 In this vein, the ACLU published a blog post
citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah as support for the
idea that any registry, even an NSEERS-style database, would be unconstitutional
because Trump’s actions and public statements have made it clear that such policies
would be motivated by discriminatory intent.100
The analysis of this issue is not quite so straightforward. Lukumi Babalu Aye,
while indeed an example of discriminatory government action failing strict scrutiny,
does not include an unambiguous statement that discriminatory animus, as one of
multiple motivations, is by itself enough to demonstrate a violation of the
Constitution.101 Recognizing this illuminates one key distinction: at least in the First
Amendment context, circumstantial evidence for discriminatory animus as
motivation for a “Muslim registry” may be primarily useful insofar as it demonstrates
either (1) that the object of a purportedly neutral policy was actually to discriminate
among religions, thus requiring that the policy be subject to strict scrutiny, or (2) that
the policy, once subject to strict scrutiny, is not appropriately tailored to achieve a
compelling governmental interest.102 Short of key advisors and Trump himself
declaring that the goal of the “registry” is simply to persecute Muslim Americans, it
is unlikely that even significant evidence of discriminatory animus would
immediately invalidate the policy and obviate the need for a traditional constitutional
review.103 In other words, under existing case law, even substantial evidence of bias
against Muslim Americans would probably not be enough to foreclose a typical strict
scrutiny analysis in favor of an immediate conclusion that the “Muslim registry” is
“clearly invalid” on First Amendment freedom of speech grounds when it allowed the police
commissioner “to exercise discretion in denying . . . [public worship] permit applications on the basis of
his interpretation, at the time, of what is deemed to be conduct condemned by the ordinance.”). Lack of
statutory standards to guide the administrator’s exercise of authority were a key factor in the decision, but
the case is an unambiguous example of a plaintiff succeeding on a First Amendment claim based on
administrative action effecting religious discrimination.
99. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 9, Washington v. Trump, No. 2:17cv-00141 (W. D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3438932/WA-AGComplaint-as-Filed.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SNP-RX7J].
100. See, e.g., David Cole, Why Trump’s Proposed Targeting of Muslims Would Be Unconstitutional,
AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Nov. 22, 2016, 10:30 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/whytrumps-proposed-targeting-muslims-would-be-unconstitutional [https://perma.cc/5CLZ-A95B].
101. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 547. Rulings that discriminatory purpose coupled with disparate
impact are sufficient to prevail on an equal protection claim have generally arisen in the race context. See,
e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982); Milligan, supra note 76, at 412 n.85.
102. Assuming that the ultimate policy is subject to strict scrutiny, convincing circumstantial evidence
of discriminatory animus would be a potent argument that the policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling governmental interest. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 545-46.
103. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 113 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[A]
showing of discriminatory purpose is necessary to impose strict scrutiny on facially neutral classifications
having a racially discriminatory impact.” (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976))).
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unconstitutional. Nevertheless, a compelling and voluminous track record
demonstrating discriminatory intent would make it harder for the executive to argue
that the law is a genuine response to a pressing security problem rather than an
expression of discriminatory animus. 104
Clearly, any argument that the registry was motivated by discriminatory animus
would need to analyze the actual structure of any future policy—currently
unknown—on its own terms. However, these allegations, which are often defeated
in litigation, could prove unusually effective in this case.105 There are two key factors
that would buttress an argument of improper discriminatory motive against a
“Muslim registry,” regardless of its structure. First, in a number of statements,
Trump and various current and former high-level advisors have been remarkably
forthright in stating their intent to discriminate against Muslims on the basis of
religion, or even expressing outright contempt for Islam. 106 This sort of record of
public discriminatory statements from policymakers is rarely available to litigants,
which is one of the reasons that claims of discriminatory animus are typically of
limited efficacy.107 Second, there remains an inescapable tension between, on the
one hand, any claim that a “Muslim registry” would be motivated not by
discriminatory animus but instead by evenhanded analysis of threats to national
security and, on the other hand, the fact that this policy would subject all members
of just one religion to new, onerous obligations even though just one out of tens of
thousands of those persons per year is found to be associated with a violent extremist
plot.108 Even when the government interests at stake are legitimate, overbroad
measures can provide evidence of “improper targeting” of a particular religion.109
Thus, even if a future “Muslim registry” were facially neutral but discriminatory in
effect, the overbroad nature of this ostensible remedy to the purported harm,
combined with statements in the public record from current and former members of
the Trump Administration, would greatly strengthen claims that the policy is

104. Religious discrimination for its own sake is not a legitimate governmental interest that can
withstand constitutional review. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)
(“to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.”); Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 547
(“Legislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to persecute or oppress a religion
or its practices.”). For an analog in the race context, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (“There
is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies
this classification.”).
105. See, e.g., Kobick, supra note 90, at 517-40; Cole, supra note 100 (“Of course, it is often difficult
to prove improper intent.”); see also K.G. Jan Pillai, Shrinking Domain of Invidious Intent, 9 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 525, 538 (2001). The analysis may be fairly searching and can include “both direct
and circumstantial evidence” of intent. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 540. See also Vill. of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 (1977) (With respect to an inquiry of whether
racial animus was a motivating factor in legislation, “[t]he legislative or administrative history may be
highly relevant, especially where there are contemporary statements by members of the decision making
body, minutes of its meetings, or reports.”).
106. See infra pp 21-23.
107. See Cole, supra note 100.
108. See Part II.A.1.
109. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 538 (“We also find significant evidence of the ordinances’
improper targeting of Santeria sacrifice in the fact that they proscribe more religious conduct than is
necessary to achieve their stated ends.”).
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motivated by the intent to discriminate among religions. This is another reason that
the policy, whatever its precise structure, is virtually certain to be subject to strict
scrutiny if it is ever implemented.110
Returning to the first factor supporting an argument of discriminatory motive,
the following is a sampling of some of the extraordinary statements Trump and his
current and former senior advisors have made in respect of Muslims and Islam.
First, Michael Flynn, Trump’s former National Security Advisor and a Trump
campaign stalwart, wrote on Twitter that “[f]ear of Muslims is RATIONAL: please
forward this to others: the truth fears no questions . . . .”111 Second, in a 2016 speech,
Flynn said that Islam is a “cancer” that “hides behind this notion of it being a
religion.”112 When asked if Flynn is “in line with how President-elect Trump views
Islam,” Reince Priebus, Trump’s now-former Chief of Staff, responded, “I think
so.”113 Third, in a December 2015 press release, Trump himself called for a “total
and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States” of indeterminate
length.114 Trump justified this by claiming that “there is a great hatred towards
Americans by large segments of the Muslim population.”115 The Trump campaign
then published a press release that includes a statement from Trump regarding his
call for the cessation of Muslim immigration:
Without looking at the various polling data, it is obvious to anybody the hatred is
beyond comprehension. Where this hatred comes from and why we will have to
determine. Until we are able to determine and understand this problem and the
dangerous threat it poses, our country cannot be the victims of horrendous attacks
by people that believe only in Jihad, and have no sense of reason or respect for
human life. If I win the election for President, we are going to Make America Great
Again.116

Fourth, Stephen Bannon, Trump’s chief strategist until August 2017, has labeled
author Robert Spencer as “one of the two or three experts in the world on this great
war we are fighting against fundamental Islam.”117 The Anti-Defamation League

110. See, e.g., N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2016)
(“Although the new provisions target African Americans with almost surgical precision, they constitute
inapt remedies for the problems assertedly justifying them and, in fact, impose cures for problems that did
not exist. . . . Faced with this record, we can only conclude that the North Carolina General Assembly
enacted the challenged provisions of the law with discriminatory intent.”).
(Feb.
26,
2016,
5:14
PM),
111.
Michael
Flynn
(@GenFlynn),
TWITTER
https://twitter.com/genflynn/status/703387702998278144 [https://perma.cc/2ZBK-9DSP].
112. Mattathias Schwartz, Donald Trump’s National Security Adviser Michael Flynn Says Islam Is
“Like
a
Cancer”,
THE
INTERCEPT
(Nov.
21,
2016,
12:10
PM),
https://theintercept.com/2016/11/21/donald-trumps-national-security-adviser-michael-flynn-says-islamis-like-a-cancer/ [https://perma.cc/Z6TB-ZQK7].
113. Id.
114. Jessica Estepa, ‘Preventing Muslim Immigration’ Statement Disappears from Trump’s
Campaign
Site,
USA
TODAY
(May
8,
2017,
3:32
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2017/05/08/preventing-muslim-immigrationstatement-disappears-donald-trump-campaign-site/101436780/ [https://perma.cc/CM7T-2PQQ].
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Josh Harkinson, Trump Campaign CEO Was a Big Promoter of Anti-Muslim Extremists,
MOTHER JONES (Sept. 15, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/09/stephenbannon-donald-trump-muslims-fear-loathing [https://perma.cc/FMS5-WRLP].
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describes Spencer as an “anti-Muslim extremist.”118 Spencer runs the “Jihad Watch”
website119 and counts among his books “The Truth About Muhammad: Founder of
the World’s Most Intolerant Religion.”120
Although the actual policymaking process giving rise to any future “Muslim
registry” will be key to any argument that the policymaking motive was illegitimate,
the above examples are just a portion of the unusually large quantity of circumstantial
evidence available to support a claim that the policy was primarily motivated by
discriminatory animus against Muslims rather than a legitimate concern for national
security. And in the context of a First Amendment challenge, the inquiry as to motive
should consider relevant these statements from Trump himself and various key
policy advisers given the expansive nature of the review; “[t]he Court must survey
meticulously the circumstances of governmental categories to eliminate, as it were,
religious gerrymanders.”121
Although politicians now rarely leave evidence of express discriminatory intent
for litigants to use as ammunition in a constitutional challenge, Trump and his
advisors have been something of an exception in this regard. In addition to the above
statements, Trump’s Immigration Ban provides another example. Within days of the
order’s passage,122 Rudolph Giuliani appeared on television to say that he had helped
prepare the executive order after President Trump had enlisted his help to impose a
“Muslim ban” but “do it legally.”123 Michael Flynn, Jr., a former member of Trump’s
transition team, also referred to the executive order twice on Twitter using the
“#MuslimBan” hashtag.124 Additionally, reports indicated that the order had not
118. Jessica Reaves, Anti-Muslim Extremists Target Chobani CEO, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE
(Nov.
3,
2016),
http://blog.adl.org/extremism/anti-muslim-extremists-target-chobani-ceo
[https://perma.cc/VT5N-5N8B].
119. JIHAD WATCH, https://www.jihadwatch.org [https://perma.cc/8CKT-FQFS]. The website is
principally a collection of tendentious blog posts about current events that portray Islam in a negative (or
very negative) light.
120. ROBERT SPENCER, THE TRUTH ABOUT MUHAMMAD: FOUNDER OF THE WORLD’S MOST
INTOLERANT RELIGION (2007). Additionally, while a student at Duke University, White House senior
policy advisor Stephen Miller co-founded the “Terrorism Awareness Project” with the David Horowitz
Freedom Center, a group aiming to combat attempts by the “radical left and its Islamist allies to destroy
American values and disarm [the United States].” Andrew Kaczynski & Chris Massie, In College, Trump
Aide Stephen Miller Led Controversial ‘Terrorism Awareness Project’ Warning of ‘Islamofascism’, CNN
(Feb. 15, 2017, 8:40 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/15/politics/kfile-stephen-miller-terrorismawareness/ [https://perma.cc/AQ77-MJ5S]. Miller’s group attempted to run a nationwide ad campaign
using an advertisement designed by Robert Spencer, but newspapers rejected the ad. Id.
121. Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n
of City of N.Y. , 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). See also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S.
228, 246 (1982) (“Since Everson v. Board of Education, this Court has adhered to the principle, clearly
manifested in the history and logic of the Establishment Clause, that no State can ‘pass laws which aid
one religion’ or that ‘prefer one religion over another.’ This principle of denominational neutrality has
been restated on many occasions. In Zorach v. Clauson we said that ‘[t]he government must be neutral
when it comes to competition between sects.’” (citations omitted)); Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 523
(“The principle that government may not enact laws that suppress religious belief or practice is so well
understood that few violations are recorded in our opinions.”).
122. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
123. Wang, supra note 80.
124. Matthew Nussbaum, Flynn’s Son Says ‘Muslim Ban’ is ‘Necessary’, POLITICO (Jan. 29, 2017,
11:29
AM
EST),
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/michael-flynn-muslim-ban-234328
[https://perma.cc/UM4L-ZABQ].
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been vetted or even shown to DHS prior to its execution, undercutting the Trump
Administration’s argument that the order was intended to improve national
security.125 This sort of open admission of discriminatory intent by former advisers
to the president, combined with the president’s own earlier call for a “total and
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States,”126 is unique in modern
presidential politics and appears to have contributed to courts’ willingness to
temporarily enjoin enforcement of the Immigration Ban.127 Similarly, the
unprecedented actions and statements of Trump and his advisors make any future
“Muslim registry” unusually vulnerable to arguments of improper discriminatory
intent.
III. POSSIBLE COUNTERARGUMENTS
A. Introduction
The above analysis shows that any legislation or executive action creating a
“Muslim registry” would be exceptionally weak to constitutional challenge under the
First and Fifth Amendments even if facially neutral. Given that the constitutional
deficiencies have not convinced President Trump or his advisors to definitively
abandon the proposal, it is worth considering what sort of counterarguments
policymakers might raise in support of this constitutionally suspect program. And
that in turn raises another important question: how compelling are those
counterarguments in light of existing case law?
B. Could the Emergency Powers or War Powers Available to the President or
Congress Be Used to Authorize a “Muslim Registry”?
Facially neutral or not, the “Muslim registry” has such clear constitutional
failings that it would seem to be doomed under any ordinary process of legal review.
But what if President Trump, possibly even with statutory authorization from
Congress, declared that ongoing military conflicts or a national security crisis
mandated this extraordinary measure? 128 There is empirical evidence that civil

125. See Michael D. Shear & Ron Nixon, How Trump’s Rush to Enact an Immigration Ban Unleashed
Global Chaos, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/us/politics/donaldtrump-rush-immigration-order-chaos.html [https://perma.cc/589S-7SFG].
126. Estepa, supra note 114.
127. Wittes & Jurecic, supra note 52.
128. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, as of the writing of this Article there were seven
ongoing overseas conflicts that have a “critical” impact on United States interests. Global Conflict
Tracker, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 22, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflicttracker/ [https://perma.cc/WHH8-EAVJ]. The president might use international conflicts, or unspecified
intelligence purportedly identifying a domestic security threat, to attempt to justify a “Muslim registry.”
For example, Kellyanne Conway, Counselor to the President, has already invoked unspecified intelligence
available to President Trump as an explanation for Trump’s explosive claim that President Obama ordered
wiretaps on Trump’s office telephones. Louis Nelson, Conway Blames Trump’s Wiretap Dust-Up on
(Mar.
6,
2017,
10:15
AM
EST),
‘Double
Standard’,
POLITICO
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/03/trump-wiretap-obama-kellyanne-conway-235714
[https://perma.cc/Z77E-XDNE]. Some legal scholars are already speculating that Trump might seize on
a terrorist attack to try to greatly expand the scope of his executive power. See, e.g., Ryan Lizza, How
President Trump Could Seize More Power After a Terrorist Attack, THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 7, 2017),
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liberties are repressed somewhat during times of war and national security crisis in
the United States,129 and Korematsu130 casts a menacing shadow.131 The question
then becomes: does judicial precedent suggest that the emergency powers of the
president could protect a “Muslim registry” from invalidation on constitutional
grounds?
In some respects this is a challenging question to answer because it necessitates
an increasing number of hypothetical assumptions. Consider, for example, these
unknown factors that could influence the answer: the occurrence of another largescale terrorist attack on American soil, dramatic changes in ongoing overseas
military conflicts, the nature and severity of the purported national security crisis at
issue, contemporaneous public statements by Trump and his advisors, statutory
authorization from Congress, and public opinion. Still, assuming that these factors
are roughly in the range of historical precedents it is possible to provide some
analysis grounded in case law and political context.
One seemingly plausible scenario would be the Trump Administration asserting
that, based on classified intelligence-gathering, the country is facing an immediate
threat of additional terrorist attacks to be perpetrated by radicalized American
citizens and the “Muslim registry” is necessary to prevent these acts of violence. 132
When challenged on a constitutional basis, the administration would presumably
claim that the niceties of typical First Amendment and equal protection jurisprudence
would put thousands of American lives at risk. This is not a novel tactic; the
executive branch used a similar invocation of national security necessity as
justification for internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II.133 In fact,
Trump himself has used similar rhetoric to defend the Immigration Ban. 134
What happens next? In a 2014 speech, Justice Scalia said of the JapaneseAmerican internment, “[Y]ou are kidding yourself if you think the same thing will
not happen again. . . . It was wrong, but I would not be surprised to see it happen
again—in time of war.”135 It is certainly possible that war or acts of terrorism
occurring during the Trump Administration could lead the Court to hand down new,
restrictive decisions on civil rights that, like Korematsu, the legal community later
comes to view with scorn. However, case law and the political context suggest that
President Trump’s “Muslim registry” will not form the basis for those decisions.
A full analysis of the range and nature of the emergency powers of the president
http://www.newyorker.com/news/ryan-lizza/how-president-trump-could-seize-more-power-after-aterrorist-attack [https://perma.cc/7V27-GT6G] (quoting Professor John Yoo).
129. Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only Non-war Cases, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 11 (2005). See id. at 13-14 for a brief overview of curtailments of civil liberties during
periods of war or national security crisis.
130. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
131. See Part III.C below for an analysis of the potential impact of Korematsu on the possibility of a
“Muslim registry” surviving judicial review.
132. Kellyanne Conway has already made a similar invocation to explain President Trump’s claim
that President Obama ordered wiretaps on Trump’s office telephones. See Nelson, supra note 128.
133. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 92-93 (1943).
This is discussed in more detail in Part III.C below.
134. See Lizza, supra note 128.
135. Ilya Somin, Justice Scalia on Kelo and Korematsu, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/02/08/justice-scalia-on-kelo-andkorematsu/ [https://perma.cc/9Q26-WJUH].
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during a national security crisis is beyond the scope of this Article, but also
unnecessary for the purposes of this analysis.136 The powers, to the extent they exist,
are not clearly defined and depend in large part on what Congress is willing to
authorize.137 However, even when the legislative and executive branches act
together in a time of war, judicial precedent has established that their constitutional
powers are not so greatly expanded from peacetime. A synthesis of case law and the
relevant doctrines suggests that the infringement of fundamental constitutional rights
during wartime is permitted “only so far as justified by a clear, identifiable, and
compelling public interest.”138 Although structural, practical, and political obstacles
to obtaining judicial relief have thwarted plaintiffs in previous challenges to
executive action in the national security context, proponents of the “Muslim registry”
should not find comfort in this fact. 139 Why? First, the policy would create potential
plaintiffs out of millions of American citizens. Second, the public reaction and the
reaction of the legal community to Trump’s Immigration Ban demonstrate that there
is a great deal of intense political energy and significant legal resources ready to be
deployed to fight high-profile Trump Administration policies that appear to target
Muslims in a discriminatory manner.140 Third, any Muslim Americans subject to
any attempt to enforce the “Muslim registry” would surely have standing to
challenge the policy, thereby solving one of the problems that frequently stymies
plaintiffs fighting government action in the national security context. 141
Implementation of the proposal would likely lead to an avalanche of headlinegrabbing litigation backed by some of the most prominent litigators in the country. 142
136. For a thorough analysis in the post-September 11 context, see John C. Dehn, The Commanderin-Chief and the Necessities of War: A Conceptual Framework, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 599, 651-52 (2011).
See generally Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1993).
137. Dehn, supra note 136, at 651-52; Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 42627 (2011).
138. Dehn, supra note 136, at 659-60. Also, “the Court’s precedent fully supports the proposition that
laws plainly calculated to cabin executive discretion in armed conflict are not subject to derogation by the
Commander-in-Chief on claims of general military authority or necessity.” Id. at 662.
139. Id. at 652-53 (quoting HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 148 (1990)).
140. See Andy Newman, Highlights: Reaction to Trump’s Travel Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/nyregion/trump-travel-ban-protests-briefing.html
[https://perma.cc/8R86-9DEN].
141. See Dehn, supra note 136, at 653 (quoting HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 148 (1990)). Certain states might
also bring a legal challenge against the policy. California, for example, has passed a state law that would
prohibit the creation of databases based on religion. Melody Gutierrez, Gov. Brown Signs Bill banning
Creation of Any Muslim Registries, SFGATE (Oct. 15, 2017), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/GovBrown-signs-bill-banning-creation-of-any-12280180.php [https://perma.cc/2GZ8-VDFM].
142. In response to Trump’s initial Immigration Ban, “[a]n army of corporate lawyers” joined “an
effort to advise travelers detained at US airports,” with active participation from some of the largest U.S.
law firms. Lindsay Fortado, Corporate Lawyers Prepare for Battle Over Trump’s Travel Ban, FINANCIAL
TIMES (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/06468f6e-e72c-11e6-967b-c88452263daf
[https://perma.cc/BZB5-NAF6]. Take also for example the offer of Ted Boutrous, the global co-chair of
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher’s litigation group, to provide pro bono representation to any person Trump sues
for exercising their free speech rights. Boutrous wrote in October 2016 that 100 additional lawyers had
already offered to join him. Ted Boutrous, Why I’ll Defend Anyone Trump Sues for Speaking Freely,
POLITICO (Oct. 31, 2016), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/10/trump-lawsuit-free-speechdefense-214404 [https://perma.cc/5AS8-FA9L].
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Litigation in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks demonstrates
the limited constitutional flexibility available to the executive branch even during a
period of national security crisis. Take, for example, the case of Yaser Hamdi, an
American citizen captured in Afghanistan and accused of fighting for the Taliban
during the United States’ post-September 11 war in Afghanistan. 143 Hamdi was
brought to a naval brig in South Carolina, held without legal counsel, and
interrogated, with no notice as to if or when he might be arraigned in a U.S. court.144
Hamdi’s father brought a habeas corpus petition in federal court, which the Supreme
Court adjudicated on appeal in 2004.145 Among other issues, the Court considered
what process Hamdi was due under the Fourteenth Amendment given that he was
captured and initially detained overseas in an armed conflict and a time of war. 146
The government argued that Hamdi’s detention was within its power, that courts
were not in a position to engage in “military decision-making,” and that, out of
respect for separation of powers, courts should not review individualized detention
cases.147 Nonetheless, the Court engaged in a due process balancing analysis, noting:
[A]s critical as the Government’s interest may be in detaining those who actually
pose an immediate threat to the national security of the United States during ongoing
international conflict, history and common sense teach us that an unchecked system
of detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression and abuse of
others who do not present that sort of threat.148

The Court also noted that the judicial branch must “pay proper heed” not only to
national security but also “to the constitutional limitations safeguarding essential
liberties that remain vibrant even in times of security concerns.”149 Considering the
Court’s measured approach following the September 11 terrorist attacks, it is hard to
imagine how even an immediate threat to national security or an ongoing war could
possibly justify a “Muslim registry” on the basis of the war powers or emergency
powers available to the president.150
Empirical research quantifying the impact of war and national security crises on
Supreme Court civil rights and civil liberties decisions supports the contention that
the emergency powers, whatever they may be, are limited in this context. 151 In a
2005 analysis, Professor Lee Epstein and others examined wartime and crisis-time

143. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510-12 (2004). Majority opinion by Justice O’Connor with
Justice Souter concurring in part but finding that the detention was a violation of law and agreeing that
Hamdi is entitled to notice of the reason for his detention, a fair chance to contest his detention, and legal
counsel, id. at 553 (Souter. J., concurring).
144. Id. at 510-11.
145. Id. at 511.
146. Id. at 524.
147. Id. at 527 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 26).
148. Id. at 530.
149. Id. at 539.
150. See Dehn, supra note 136, at 645-47; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006)
(finding that a Bush Administration Military Commission Order, which had been challenged by Salim
Hamdan, a Yemeni national awaiting military commission trial, was invalid for violating various domestic
laws).
151. Lee Epstein, supra note 129, at 9. This analysis does not consider the magnitude of the rights
claims at stake in the cases analyzed, but its findings do provide general support for the contention that
the impact of wartime on civil rights outcomes is limited.
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Supreme Court cases from 1941 through 2002.152 They found, first, that the
existence of war or a national security conflict had no statistical impact on the
outcome of civil rights and liberties cases that are directly related to the conflict. 153
They also found that the negative impact on civil rights and liberties claimants for
unrelated cases during wartime was about ten percent. 154 That is, the probability of
the plaintiff winning a civil rights or civil liberties claim decreases by about ten
percent on average during a time of war or crisis. 155 This is a significant distinction
between wartime and peacetime, but hardly a paradigm-shattering shift that suggests
the Court would jettison decades of First Amendment precedent in a support of a
“Muslim registry” due to a purported national security emergency.
There is another factor that is likely to play an important role in any judicial
evaluation of a “Muslim registry” to the extent that emergency powers or a national
security crisis is invoked to defend the policy. The judiciary justifies a deferential
approach to the executive in matters of national security in part because it assumes
that members of the executive branch act in good faith. 156 Benjamin Wittes and
Quinta Jurecic have argued incisively that an unprecedented weakening of this
assumption of good faith with respect to the Trump Administration has increased the
willingness of the judiciary and other elements of the government to resist or reject
certain executive initiatives.157 The assumption that the executive is faithfully
attempting to fulfill its constitutional duties may be an even more important factor
influencing judicial review when the president asserts military necessity in the
wartime context.158 If so, this bodes particularly ill for any attempt by the Trump
Administration to defend, on the basis of the executive’s national security judgment,
an extraordinary, constitutionally suspect action that cannot be justified with
empirical evidence.159 This unusual potential weakness of executive policy with
respect to the “Muslim registry” is at root contextual rather than substantive, but it
152. Id. at 8.
153. See id. at 72.
154. Id. at 71.
155. Id.
156. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19, 33 (1827) (“Every public officer is presumed to act in obedience to
his duty, until the contrary is shown; and, a fortiori, this presumption ought to be favourably applied to
the chief magistrate of the Union.”); see also Wittes & Jurecic, supra note 52.
157. Wittes & Jurecic, supra note 52. Some of the fuel for this fire no doubt comes from the
administration’s inability to clearly defend its policies on an evidentiary basis. For example, in a March
7, 2017 press briefing, while discussing President Trump’s second executive order halting immigration
from certain Muslim-majority countries, the acting spokesman of the State Department cited vetting
problems with travelers from Iran but was unable to say whether the U.S. would engage with Iran to
improve vetting of Iranian visitors and was unable to explain why Syrian refugees were banned under the
first immigration executive order but not the second. Josh Rogin, Opinion, No News at the State
Department, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/joshrogin/wp/2017/03/07/no-news-at-the-state-department/ [https://perma.cc/24DY-8DPN].
158. Consider, for example, the assumption of good faith implicit in the final two sentences of the
majority opinion in Korematsu: “There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military
authorities considered that the need for action was great, and time was short. We cannot—by availing
ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—now say that at that time these actions [excluding people
of Japanese ethnicity from certain regions of the United States] were unjustified.” Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944).
159. Recall again the tiny fraction of Muslim Americans involved in terroristic activities compared
to the broader population. See infra Part II.A.
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could prove important nonetheless.
The analysis above foresees a grim fate for any “Muslim registry,” regardless of
what extraordinary national security justifications the president may supply. This
may seem hard to square with Korematsu. If constitutional protections do not
significantly recede in times of war, what do we make of the Court’s finding that a
race-based policy targeting Japanese-Americans was a proper exercise of executive
authority? Indeed, as President Trump himself has compared his proposal for a ban
on Muslims entering the United States to President Roosevelt’s wartime policies,
references to the Japanese-American internment are likely to emerge again should
government policymakers ever attempt to make the “Muslim registry” a reality. So,
what about Korematsu?
C. Does Korematsu v. United States Provide Support for the Contention that a
“Muslim Registry” Would Be Constitutional?
In Korematsu, the Court upheld a military order that subjected all persons of
Japanese ancestry, including American citizens, to exclusion from certain areas of
the West Coast of the United States.160 This was one of the military orders that
formed the foundation for the internment of tens of thousands of JapaneseAmericans and Japanese nationals living on the West Coast.161 In upholding the
order, the Court wrote that “all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a
single racial group are immediately suspect” and must be subject to “the most rigid
scrutiny.”162 The Court’s claim that it was “not unmindful of the hardships imposed
by [the order] upon a large group of American citizens” was belied by its subsequent
dismissive proclamation that “hardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation
of hardships.”163 Writing for the majority, Justice Black concluded by stating—from
today’s vantage point, preposterously—that the exclusion order was not the result of
“hostility to [Fred Korematsu] or his race” but instead an acceptable consequence of
the U.S. armed forces deciding that “the military urgency of the situation demanded
that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily”
pursuant to valid authorization from Congress.164 In reaching its conclusion, the
Court did not discuss the remarkably compelling evidence that the general who made
the determination of supposed military necessity, John L. DeWitt, was driven by
anti-Japanese racism (among other statements and actions, DeWitt described the
Japanese as “an enemy race”).165
Korematsu was controversial even when it was decided. Writing in 1945,

160. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215-16.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 216.
163. Id. at 219. Trump himself said something similar in initially refusing to condemn the JapaneseAmerican internment during the presidential campaign: “It’s a tough thing. It’s tough. But you know war
is tough.” Michael Scherer, Exclusive: Donald Trump Says He Might Have Supported Japanese
Internment, TIME (Dec. 8, 2015, 9:02 AM), http://time.com/4140050/donald-trump-muslims-japaneseinternment/ [https://perma.cc/9M24-5Y7P].
164. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223.
165. Id. at 236 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (quoting JOHN L. DEWITT, FINAL REPORT, JAPANESE
EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST, 1942, at 34 (1943)); see also Mark V. Tushnet, Defending
Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 273, 288 (2003).
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Professor Eugene Rostow of Yale Law School described the Japanese-American
internment as “a disaster” instigated by a minority of racist agitators on the West
Coast and “the worst blow our liberties have sustained in many years.”166 Even
considering its ignominious reception, the case has not aged well. It now forms part
of the “anticanon,” joining Dred Scott,167 Plessy,168 and Lochner169 to form the group
of “decisions the legal community regards as the worst of the worst.”170 Importantly,
the “legal community” as used here includes Supreme Court justices. In a 2011
analysis of Senate confirmation hearings, Professor Jamal Greene found that only
five cases had been openly disavowed by nominees to the Supreme Court who were
subsequently confirmed; Korematsu is among these cases, garnering disavowals
from Justices Sotomayor, Alito, Roberts, and Ginsburg. 171 Greene concludes that
“Supreme Court nominees believe they will curry favor with senators and the public
by declaring [Dred Scott, Plessy, Lochner, and Korematsu] to be reliably bad
law.”172 Greene also notes that although the Court has cited Korematsu positively
many times, the “overwhelming majority of these positive citations have been in
support of the proposition that governmental racial classifications receive strict
scrutiny from reviewing courts.”173
Finally, although the Court has not yet overturned Korematsu,174 in addition to
the case having become a subject of scorn and source of chagrin for the legal
community, the internment itself was formally repudiated by Congress in the 1980s.
In 1988, President Reagan signed into law a bill to “acknowledge the fundamental
injustice” of the internment of Japanese-Americans, “apologize on behalf of the
people of the United States,” and to make restitution to internees.175
Greene performs the exercise of attempting to defend Korematsu on its own
merits, arguing that under the circumstances and in light of Hirabayashi v. United
States there are reasonable counterarguments against singling out Korematsu as a
case of unique jurisprudential deficiency.176 Nonetheless, he concludes that
Korematsu is in fact “the hardest of the four [anticanonical cases] to defend using
166. Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 489-90, 496
(1945).
167. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
168. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
169. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
170. Greene, supra note 137, at 387.
171. Id. at 391-92. Writing for herself and Justice Breyer in a dissent, Justice Ginsburg also concluded
that the Korematsu decision “yielded a pass for an odious, gravely injurious racial classification” and
noted that “[a] Korematsu-type classification, as I read the opinions in this case [Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena], will never again survive scrutiny: Such a classification, history and precedent instruct,
properly ranks as prohibited.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 275 (1995).
172. Greene, supra note 137, at 396 (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 398.
174. Fred Korematsu’s conviction was later overturned pursuant to a 1983 coram nobis action in
federal district court, but this did not overrule Korematsu as precedent. Korematsu v. United States, 584
F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
175. Restitution for World War II Internment of Japanese-Americans and Aleuts, 50 U.S.C. §§ 4201,
4124 (2012).
176. Greene, supra note 137, at 422-25. In particular, Greene reviews Korematsu in light of
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), and notes that the executive action at
issue in Korematsu had been preauthorized by Congress. Id.
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conventional constitutional arguments.”177 In any event, the evolution of strict
scrutiny to its modern form (a form detailed in Section II of this Article), should
make clear that the Court’s application of “the most rigid scrutiny” in Korematsu is
a far cry from what that phrase has come to mean in more recent cases. 178 In short,
in addition to being inconsistent with contemporary jurisprudence, Korematsu is
reviled by the legal community at large and part of a national abuse so extraordinary
that the federal government issued a formal apology via statute and provided
financial recompense to its victims.
In this respect, Korematsu does appear to be a seminal decision after all, and one
that may offer insight into how an attempt to implement a “Muslim registry,”
justified by purported national security exigencies or military necessity, would be
treated by the judicial branch. But Korematsu’s likely influence is not what
defenders like Carl Higbie or Al Baldasaro are hoping to achieve by tying the Trump
Administration’s policies vis-à-vis Muslims to the internment of JapaneseAmericans. How might these analogies to a widely-repudiated program of racial
discrimination influence judicial review of the “Muslim registry?”
Professor Mark Tushnet has argued that a form of “social learning” guides the
American government’s treatment of civil liberties in wartime. 179 He summarizes
the concept as follows:
Knowing that government officials in the past have in fact exaggerated threats to
national security or have taken actions that were ineffective with respect to the
threats that actually were present, we have become increasingly skeptical about
contemporary claims regarding those threats, with the effect that the scope of
proposed government responses to threats has decreased.180

In Tushnet’s conceptualization, the challenge to balancing legal protections of
civil liberties lies in the fact that—although today Americans look back with
incredulity at claims of Japanese-American subversion and arguments for restricting
free speech during the first and second Red Scares—each new crisis presents
different facts, brings its own fresh uncertainty, and demands a unique governmental
response, and so the lessons learned from past cases are inadequate protection against
future abuses.181 Tushnet’s principal evidence takes the form of a survey of civil
liberties case law beginning with the suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil
War, moving through the Red Scares and into more recent cases, including a
177. Id. at 422.
178. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). The 1960s and 1970s in particular marked
a significant period of expansion in the protective interpretations of the First Amendment. Milligan, supra
note 76, at 405.
179. Tushnet, supra note 165, at 283-84.
180. Id. For a counterargument, see Lee Epstein, supra note 129, at 34 (summarizing the argument
that “statist ratchets” and increasing “dosages” of the curtailment of civil liberties are the legacy of
successive layers of crisis jurisprudence). However, this counterargument is not so convincing in light of
Greene’s analysis of post-September 11 references to Korematsu as judicial authority, which is described
later in this Part III.B. Although in their statistical analysis of Supreme Court crisis jurisprudence Epstein
et al. found no evidence for either the “social learning” or the “ratchet” theory, this is a purely quantitative
analysis of civil liberties cases that does not consider the nature of the claims at stake, and thus seems illsuited to evaluating Tushnet’s argument that the government makes new (perhaps progressively less
egregious) “mistakes” with each successive crisis. Id. at 80-81.
181. See Tushnet, supra note 165, at 300-01.
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comparison of Korematsu to Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.182 Using this case law as evidence,
Tushnet argues that “the legal world’s retrospective evaluation of actions taken the
last time around is that those actions were unjustified.”183 As a result of this
retrospective analysis, “we learn from our mistakes[,]” but that learning is limited in
that it only ensures “that we do not repeat precisely the same errors.”184
Some of Greene’s research provides interesting support for Tushnet’s
conclusion. In Tushnet’s model, once a case achieves sufficient toxicity, even if not
overturned it should prove an unappealing source of authority for Supreme Court
litigants. This is because approving citations of anticanonical cases in support of a
litigant’s position might connect the new case at issue to one of the Court’s past
“mistakes” in the eyes of the reviewing justices. Indeed, in a review of “every
publicly available Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinion since September 11 and
the merits [briefings] and published opinions in ten detention-related cases to reach
the Supreme Court or federal courts of appeals during that period,” Greene found
just one citation to Korematsu, which was included simply to buttress a claim that
the judiciary had authority to review the executive action in question.185 Concluding
his review, Greene notes, “[i]t is fair to say that Korematsu is almost uniformly
recognized by serious lawyers and judges to be bad precedent, indeed so bad that its
use by one’s opponent is likely to prompt a vociferous and public denial.”186
In this case, however, Trump himself and supporters like Higbie have already
taken the initiative in drawing similarities between the Trump Administration’s
policies and President Roosevelt’s wartime actions. By doing so, they have already
anchored the proposals they seek to defend to “precisely the same errors” that occupy
the very core of the anticanon.187 Although competent lawyers defending future
Trump Administration policies will likely work to avoid even the suggestion of any
similarities to Korematsu, the President of the United States has already compared
one of his own proposals to discriminate against Muslims for purported national
security benefits (i.e., the Immigration Ban) to President Roosevelt’s wartime
policies. The comparison is an indelible part of the public record.
Viewed from this angle, Korematsu is an anti-precedent, even if never formally
rejected by the Court. It is a repulsive lodestar from which subsequent policymakers
have worked to distinguish their own efforts. The fact that Korematsu has never
been overturned may well be more an effect of America’s “social learning” than a
validation of the decision; across seventy years, many wars, and a massive terrorist
attack on U.S. soil, the Court has never had occasion to review another explicit
government policy of widespread race-based internment because the country has
learned something from this dark chapter of its history.
So
Korematsu
stands, for now. But its value as precedent for executive action is almost certainly
negative. As a substantive matter, the contours of strict scrutiny have emerged over
the intervening decades and the credulous acceptance of explicit distinctions among
182. See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev’d, 316 F.3d 450
(4th Cir. 2003). Tushnet’s article predated the Supreme Court’s adjudication of the case.
183. Tushnet, supra note 165, at 291.
184. Id. at 292.
185. Greene, supra note 137, at 400.
186. Id. at 402 (emphasis added).
187. Tushnet, supra note 165, at 292.
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protected classes that characterizes Korematsu no longer reflects the state of the
Constitution as applied by the Court. But substance aside, the internment of
Japanese-Americans and the Korematsu decision are a moral and political
stinkbomb, lambasted by today’s lawyers and judges and formally repudiated by
Congress and the executive branch. In every meaningful sense, Korematsu is the
opposite of “good law.”
D. Could Other Programs, Such as NSEERS and Religious Registries in Prisons,
Be Used to Defend the “Muslim Registry” from a Constitutional Challenge?
There are various other arguments that proponents of a “Muslim registry” might
raise based on flawed analogies to distinguishable case law. Unlike approving
references to Korematsu as precedent, these throwaway arguments have not yet been
publicly espoused by Trump or his political allies, so this Article will dispense with
them quickly. They are not likely to convince any judge, lawyer, or legal academic
reasonably familiar with First and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence and accordingly
they do not require detailed analysis here.
The first such argument is that religious registries already exist and have not yet
failed constitutional challenge—in prisons. For example, a prison inmate in New
York State brought a legal challenge in federal court when he was subject to a
requirement “to register as a Shiite Muslim in order to continue participating in Shiite
classes and fasting during” several holidays.188 In analyzing the plaintiff’s claims,
the District Court correctly noted that “free exercise claims of prisoners are evaluated
‘under a “reasonableness” test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged
infringements of fundamental constitutional rights.’”189 This reasonableness analysis
is clearly distinguishable from the standard of review that would apply to a registry
burdening the religious liberty of free American citizens on a discriminatory basis. 190
A second such argument is that the NSEERS program withstood constitutional
challenge and the “Muslim registry” would simply apply regulations similar to the
approved NSEERS rules, but to a broader group of people. This elides what was
surely the principal factor in NSEERS’s survival: the fact that it applied only to noncitizen immigrants. Allegations that NSEERS violated equal protection of noncitizens collided with the extremely deferential standard that the courts apply to
restrictions on immigration.191 Like rules regulating the treatment of prisoners, laws
and executive actions regulating immigration based on protected classes are not
relevant authority to support the constitutionality of a “Muslim registry” because
they are subject to a different, more lenient standard of review than government
policies that target protected classes of free American citizens.
The two arguments above are easily defeated and do not require additional
discussion. They are mentioned in brief here because they are just plausible enough
and superficially relevant enough that they may be an attractive defense for future

188. Williams v. King, 56 F. Supp. 3d 308, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
189. Id. at 322 (quoting O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)).
190. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). When a prison regulation impinges on inmates’
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.
Id.
191. See, e.g., Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 72 (1st Cir. 2006).
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proponents of a “Muslim registry” who are not familiar with First and Fifth
Amendment case law. Two years ago, it was virtually inconceivable that a key
campaign advisor of the President of the United States would describe one of the
president’s executive orders as aiming to effect a “Muslim ban” but seeking “to do
it legally.”192 In this context, it would be little surprise if inapposite comparisons to
NSEERS and prison registries of Muslim inmates surface in any future political
debates about a “Muslim registry.”
IV. CONCLUSION
The proposals analyzed in this Article will hopefully never advance beyond
inchoate hypotheticals. Nonetheless, they deserve serious consideration as a legal
matter in light of their promotion by the man who is now the President of the United
States and the actions that he has taken during his first months in office. A review
of relevant case law demonstrates unequivocally that a “Muslim Registry” would
violate the Constitution, and that any wartime emergency powers available to the
president would be insufficient to remedy the gross constitutional deficiencies of
such a policy. Furthermore, the foreseeable measures that policy architects might
undertake to disguise the registry as facially neutral will almost certainly fail
constitutional review if the resulting policy effectively targets Muslim Americans by
criteria other than religion (and if not, then the resulting policy will not be a “Muslim
registry”).
Finally, the defenses that proponents of the registry might raise are not likely to
be effective. Korematsu presents an analysis that is materially and substantively
different from subsequent cases applying strict scrutiny. Furthermore, from a
political standpoint Korematsu is likely one of the worst possible sources of
supporting authority available for any policy, as evidenced by the OLC’s scrupulous
avoidance of positive citations to the case following September 11, 2001 and
Congress’s formal repudiation of the Japanese-American internment. Other contexts
in which religious registries have withstood constitutional challenge are dissimilar
and subject to different standards of scrutiny. There is, in short, no legal authority
that provides any convincing support for the constitutionality of this proposal.
Although the precise contours of its form remain subject to some guesswork, any
“Muslim registry” that is substantively true to its name will violate and endanger the
constitutional rights of the American people. And if, at some point in the future, the
Trump Administration attempts to turn the registry into a reality, the courts must
strike it down.

192. Wang, supra note 80.

